A first-price sealed-bid auction of an item for which bidders are risk-neutral and have privately known values is shown to have an equilibrium in mixed behavioral strategies if the joint distribution of bidders' values has a continuous density on a cubical support. Such an equilibrium has atomless distributions of bids and is not affected by the rule for resolving tied bids.
This paper introduces a new method to establish existence of an equilibrium of an auction.
Here it is applied to equilibria in behavioral strategies for a first-price sealed-bid auction of a single item for which bidders have privately known values drawn from a joint distribution.
1
The only restriction is that this distribution has a density that is positive and continuous on a hypercube.
The method circumvents discontinuities due to tie-breaking rules. First one establishes existence of equilibria for a modified auction in which every bidder offering the highest bid wins a copy of the item. For this modified auction there is a well-defined fixed-point problem for which equilibria are solutions. Then one establishes that equilibria obtained as limit points of equilibria of payoff perturbations of the modified auction have no atoms in the distributions of bids.
2
Because the probability of tied bids is zero, these equilibria of the modified auction are equilibria of the original auction, regardless of the tie-breaking rule. For the proof here, it suffices to consider perturbations of the modified auction in which a bidder anticipates that his submitted bid will be slightly distorted by noise before it is received by the auctioneer.
The Auction Game
We consider an -player game that represents a first-price sealed-bid auction for a single item. Each bidder = 1, . . . , learns privately his value for the item and then submits a bid . He wins the auction if his bid is highest, or when tied for highest, if he is selected by a tie-breaking rule. If he wins the auction then he is awarded the item and his payoff is − . Otherwise his payoff is zero. The joint probability distribution of all bidders' values is supposed to be common knowledge among the bidders. Our basic assumption is the following. 
Behavioral Strategies and Beliefs
A behavioral strategy for bidder is a transition-probability function (⋅|⋅) : B × → [0, 1] such that: for each value , (⋅| ) is a probability measure on bids in ; and for each event ∈ B, ( |⋅) is a measurable function of 's value .
4
Let Σ be the set of behavioral strategies of bidder equipped with the topology of weak convergence, viz., a sequence in Σ converges to iff for every continuous function :
3 This assumption can be weakened considerably: the distribution need only be absolutely continuous w.r.t. the product of its marginal distributions.
4 Strictly speaking a behavioral strategy is an equivalence class of functions, where is equivalent to (⋅| ) has this property for each value . Let ℋ be the set of beliefs of bidder equipped with the topology of weak convergence, and let ℋ = ∏ ℋ be the space of all belief profiles with the product topology.
We now describe the belief map : Σ → ℋ that assigns to each strategy profile a belief profile ( ) = , defined as follows. For each bidder , his value ∈ and each subset ∈ B of bids of the form = [ * , ] or [ * , ) for some bid ∈ ,
where indexes the bidders other than . Assumption 1 implies the following properties of beliefs.
Lemma 2.1. For each strategy profile ∈ Σ, if ( ) = then for each bidder :
) is point of continuity of for some iff it is a point of continuity for all .
Proof. Since is positive and continuous, the conditional density
, where the equality follows from point (1) of this lemma. Because is an arbitrary bid higher than , (2) follows from the right-continuity of distributions. Finally, (3) is a consequence of the assumption that the density function is positive. □
The space H of belief profiles consistent with some strategy profile is the range of , i.e. H = (Σ). H is a subspace of ∏ (Σ) with the product of the weak topologies on each factor. The following lemma establishes the continuity of and hence the compactness of H.
Lemma 2.2. The belief map is continuous. In particular, if
is a sequence of strategy profiles in Σ converging to then for each bidder and value ∈ the distribution ( )(⋅| ) converges weakly to ( )(⋅| ). 
Thus, for each and the sequence (⋅| ) converges weakly to (⋅| ). Therefore lim = . □
This lemma implies that convergence in H for the specified topology is the same as requiring that for each and the corresponding sequence of distributions converges. The next lemma establishes two other key properties of the belief map .
Lemma 2.3. For each bidder , ( )( | ) is an upper semi-continuous function of ( , , ). If is a point of continuity of ( ) then the function is continuous at ( , , ).
Proof. Let ( , , ) be a sequence converging to ( , , ). Let = ( ) and let be the limit. Fix any small > 0. There exists > that is a point of continuity of (⋅| ) and such that
Since is a point of continuity of there exists large enough such that for all ⩾ , ( | ) is within /4 of ( | ). Since is continuous and positive, the conditional densities (⋅| ) are an equicontinuous family parameterized by ∈ . Therefore, for large ,
Since is arbitrary, this establishes the upper semi-continuity property. If ( ) is continuous at then one can apply the same argument as above by choosing < that is a point of continuity to obtain for each that for large ,
A Fixed-Point Map on the Space of Behavioral Strategies
For each bidder define a payoff function :
If the belief ( )(⋅| ) has no atoms then the probability of tied bids is zero and therefore is indeed 's payoff function in the auction game . More generally, is generated by an allocation rule that stipulates that all among the highest bidders receive copies of the item. In other words, to surely win an item a bidder needs only to match the highest bid among his opponents, not necessarily to exceed it. We assume initially that this is indeed the allocation rule, which thus defines a related game * . Later we demonstrate that there is an equilibrium of * in which there are no atoms in the distribution of opponents' highest bids and thus this equilibrium of * is also an equilibrium of the auction game . In the modified game * , bidder 's optimal replies to a profile of bidders' strategies are obtained by solving the following maximization problem, conditional on his value :
where ( ) is the set of bids * ⩽ ⩽ . Let : × Σ ↠ be the correspondence that maps each ( , ) to the set ( , ) = arg max ∈ ( ) ( , , ) of 's optimal replies to his competitors' strategies in when his value is . Proof. Let = ( ) be 's belief. By Lemma 2.1, the payoffs are u.s.c. in the bid for each value and strategy profile , provided that bids satisfy the individual rationality condition ⩽ as above. Therefore, ( , ) is nonempty and compact for each and . Suppose ( , ) is a sequence converging to ( , ) and is a corresponding sequence of optimal replies converging to the bid . Observe that ( , , ) ⩾ lim sup ( , , ), again using ∈ ( ). To show that is an optimal reply, pick a bid that is a point of continuity
. By Lemma 2.3, ( | ) converges to ( | ). Therefore, the payoffs ( , , ) converge to ( , , ). Since each is an optimal reply, is as good a reply as . The result follows for an arbitrary bid since there exists a sequence converging to such that ( , , ) converges to ( , , ). □ For each bidder define the optimal-reply correspondence Φ : Σ ↠ Σ by specifying for each strategy profile that Φ ( ) is the set of 's behavioral strategies ∈ Σ such that for each value ∈ the support of (⋅| ) is optimal, i.e. is contained in ( , ).
Lemma 3.2. The correspondence Φ is upper semi-continuous with images that are nonempty, compact, and convex.
Proof. Since (⋅, ) is an upper semi-continuous correspondence, it admits a measurable selection, which is then a pure strategy that belongs to Φ ( ). Therefore, Φ ( ) is a nonempty set. Also it is clearly compact and convex. Upper semi-continuity follows from the upper semi-continuity of . □ Now define the joint optimal-reply correspondence Φ * : Σ ↠ Σ to be the product of the maps Φ . The Fan-Glicksberg extension of the Kakutani fixed-point theorem assures the existence of a fixed point of Φ * . Clearly, each fixed point of Φ * is an equilibrium of the game * . Observe, however, that Φ * has a trivial fixed point in which every bidder bids * regardless of his value. Nevertheless, if Φ * has another fixed point for which the strategies of the bidders have no mass points in the distributions of their bids then it is an equilibrium of the auction game . 
A Basic Existence Result for Behavioral Strategies
In this section we construct a sequence of well-behaved perturbations of the modified game * that induce perturbations of the optimal-reply correspondence Φ * . We then show that limit points of equilibria of these perturbed games are equilibria of * with no atoms in the distributions of players' bids. Hence these limit points are equilibria of the auction game .
Interpret a conditional belief (⋅| ) for bidder as a function defined for bids outside in the obvious way: ( | ) = 0 if < * and = 1 if > * . Given (⋅| ), for each positive integer and each bid define¯ ( | ) to be the expectation of (⋅| ) using the uniform distribution of bids on the interval [ − 1/ , + 1/ ], i.e.
( | ) = [2/ ]
For each define a perturbed payoff function :
Denote the game with this perturbed payoff function by . As in the previous section, one can now define an optimal reply correspondence : × Σ → by letting ( , ) be the set of maximizers of ( , , ). Also let Φ be the set of behavioral strategies that mix over these optimal replies. The previous characterizations of and Φ apply to and Φ as well. Hence the joint optimal-reply correspondence Φ : Σ ↠ Σ has a fixed point that is an equilibrium of and induces beliefs = ( ). As before,¯ ( | ) is the expectation of (⋅| ) with respect to the uniform distribution on
For an increasing subsequence of 's, the equilibrium strategy profiles and beliefs converge to limit points, say to * Proof. The proof begins with four lemmas that verify that * an equilibrium of the game * , i.e. it is an optimal reply to itself when the payoff function is . A fifth lemma verifies that there are no atoms in * , which establishes that * is an equilibrium of the auction game .
For each and bidder , let : → ℝ be the function that assigns to each value his equilibrium payoff for the equilibrium of the game . The equicontinuity property of the conditional densities (⋅| ) implies the first lemma. 
The arguments go through if one uses an atomless distribution whose density is symmetric around the mean , like the normal distribution, or an asymmetric one that is not skewed to the right.
Proof. Given any > 0, fix two bids 1 < < 2 that are points of continuity of * such that * Choose the bid 1 < + 1 such that it is a point of continuity of the belief distribution for all bidders and * ( 1 | ) ⩽ * ( | ) + for all bidders and values . For large , since 0 and 1 are points of continuity of the belief distributions, for each and ,¯ ( 0 | ) ⩽
